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PATRIARCHY AND DISCRIMINATION IN APARTHEID
SOUTH AFRICA'S ABORTION LAW
Jeremy Sakin"
I. INTRODUCION

South Africa has, until recently,' been behind the international trend

SVisiting Professor of Law, University of Maryland, University of Cincinnati, University

of Oregon, 1998; Associate Professor of Law, University of the Western Cape; Attorney
at law, State of New York, U.SA; Attorney of the High Court of South Africa; LLD.,
University ofWestern Cape; LLM., Harvard Law School; BA LLB., University of Natal.
' The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act was assented to by President Mandela

on 12 November 1996 and came into force in February 1997 (Act 92 of 1996). The
Act permits abortion on request by a woman during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
without any other conditions. The period of gestation isstated to mean 'the period of
pregnancy of a woman calculated from the first day of the menstrual period which in
relation to the pregnancy isthe last." Between 13 and 20 weeks a pregnancy can be
terminated i amedical practitioner, after consulting with the pregnant woman "isof the
opinion" that one of four conditions are present:
(I)where the pregnancy would pose a risk of injuryto the woman's physical or
mental health;
(2) were there is"substantial" riskthatthe fetus will suffer from a "severe physical
or mental abnormality;"
(3)where the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest;
(4) where the pregnancy would "significantly affect the social or economic
circumstances ofthe woman."
After 20 weeks a pregnancy can only be terminated if a medical practitioner after
consulting with another medical practitioner or registered midwife is"ofthe opinion" that
one of three circumstances are present:
I) the continued pregnancy endangers the woman's life;
2) the pregnancy would result in a "severe malformation of the fetus;"
3)the continued pregnancy "would pose a risk of injury to the fetus."
Terminations duringthe irst twelve weeks can be performed by medical practitioners as
well as registered midwives who have completed the prescribed training course. After
twelve weeks only medical practitioners can perform an abortion. SeegenerJllyjeremy
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towards abortion liberalization, having its restrictive Abortion and Sterilization Act
on the books.2 This 1975 statute was the law, as control of the law and access
to abortion had been in the hands of an 3extremely small segment of the
population throughout South Africa's history.

While itwas usual for the state to look at the issue of abortion in terms
of religious and political circumstances, a more holistic picture of the effect that
the abortion laws have had on women and their children is necessary.4 The
impact that the legislation could have on the lives of South Africa's women,
particularly those who are black, was not considered when the law was drafted.
While an attempt was made to determine public attitudes toward abortion and
what an abortion law ought to be before the Act came into force, the processes
set up to gather such data were biased to ensure that a skewed picture emerged.
This picture largely bolstered and reflected the attitudes of white, Christian, male
South Africans atthe expense of all others.
As the Act was intended to reduce the number of abortions occurring
in the white population group, the effect that it would have on other race groups
was ignored. In fact, a salient feature of the law in South Africa, all the way into
the nineties, has been discrimination in terms of race and gender in that laws
have favored the dominant minority, men rather than women, and whites rather
than blacks. This racial and patriarchal bias was reflected in the workings of the
abortion laws.
Apartheid ensured that the structuring of the various classes of South
African society mirrored the racial hierarchy. Thus, wealth has played a dynamic
role in determining which group has had access to abortion services both in the
country and abroad.
While the figure for legal abortions rose from around 500 in 1975 to
1,400 in 1993, the number of abortions that occurred outside of the provisions

Sarkin, Health, 1995 S.A. Hum. RTs. Y.B.; see alsoJeremy Sarkin, Suggesdons ForA
NewAbortonLawFor.ouihAfica 1996 S.AF.J.OFCfM.JUST. 125; seealsojeremy
Sarkin, Heath, 1996S.AFR HUm. RTs.Y.B. I.

Act 2 of 1975.
' SeeJeremy Sarkin, The Dekeopment ofa Human Right; Culture in South Afdca, 20
Hum. RTS. Q. (forthcoming 1998).
4 See Jeremy & Nancy Sarkin, Qhoice and Informed Request: The Anser to
2

Abortion:A proposal for South Aflican Abotion Reform, 1990 STEULENBOSCH L REV.
372.
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of the Act totaled somewhere in the order of 250,000 per annum For this
reason alone, the Act can be seen as a failure. The very limited grounds
permitted by the Act, as well as the exceptional stringency of procedures
mandated by the Act are the reasons for the high number of backstreet
abortions. Permission for an abortion had to be secured from a myriad of
people. The complexity of the procedures, coupled with a lack of privacy,
impeded a woman's need for secrecy, confidentiality and immediacy. This
perpetuated a continued dependence on backstreet abortions at a great cost to
the women involved, such as interms of health and finance.
When the South African courts were called upon to interpret the law
where ambiguity existed, the decision, reflective of the composition of the
judiciary, showed a patriarchal and gender-insensitive, white, male, Christian bias.

II. THE SouTH AFRICAN COMMON LAW
The South African courts have paid little attention to the definition of the
crime of abortion in terms of the common law.6 Clarkson provided an early
definition ofwhat constituted abortion in South Africa in 1904, defining it as, "the
unlawful taking or administering of poison or other noxious things, or the
unlawful use of any instrument or other means whatsoever, with the intent to
procure miscarriage."7 The expulsion ofthe fetus from the womb, thereby killing
it, was seen to be necessary for the common law crime of abortion. InAP v.
The Ste,' causingthe death of a fetus which was still in its mothers womb was
determined to be infanticide. This was equated with an abortion, following the
writings of the Dutch jurist, Van der Unden, upon whose writings South African
courts have often relied." The court, however, per Chief Justice Kotze,
suggested law reform, stating that, "[ijt may be desirable that the legislature
should make proper provision on this subject but until that isdone the court
must follow Van der Unden." 0

' SeeJeremy Sarkin, A PaspeeonAbartnLegistion in SouthAfnca &/ofitghts
E- 1993 Tyds*iffvrHeedendagse Rome/rnse Hollandse Reg 83.
6 P.MA HUNT, SoLrrHArJN CM
LAWAND PROCEDURE 312 (J.R.L Milton ed.,
2ed. 1982).
7 H.T. CLARKON, HANDBOOKOF COLONAL CRIMINAL LAw 54 (1904).
118952OffRep 103.
J.VAN DERLINDEN, INTrITUrES OF HOLLAND 2.5.12 (H.Juntatrans., 3d ed. 1897).
1 18952OffRep 105.

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 4

In R v. Hine," the possibility was contemplated that abortion could be
murder. In R v. Davies and another,2 however, it seems as though the
Appellate Division did not regard abortion as murder. 3 While Voet defined
abortion asthe untimely forcing out orgetting rid of an embryo, 4 Gardinerand
Lansdowne saw it as "any means by which the untimely expulsion of the fetus is
effected,"'" and De Wet and Swanepoel believed it was the "afdoqWng
[expulsion] van die lewende vrze.'6 In the first edition of their book, De Wet
and Swanepoel defined abortion as, 'the killing and causing expulsion from the
uterus of a human fetus".'7 They stated that, according to the common law,
killing ofthe fetus was not sufficient to constitute the crime of abortion; the fetus
must also have been expelled from the womb.'
Ifthe fetus isnot killed but isbom prematurely, then the only crime with
which the abortionist could be charged was attempted abortion.' 9 While jurists,
commenting on the common law, regarded expulsion as a necessary element
of the crime of abortion, Hunt believes that what they actually contemplated is
the killing ofthe fetus? ° He bases this on the notion that historically abortion was
procured by inducing labor. Therefore, he argues, jurists such as Voet, Huber,
van der Linden, Carpzouius and Mathaeus implicitly refer to the killing of the
1
2

fetus.

In R v. Freestone, it was held that an attempt to procure an abortion
constitutes a crime, even if the woman involved, in fact, is not pregnant. 2 If the
fetus is already dead when the abortion is performed, then according to the
common law, no abortion occurred. However, the woman can be prosecuted

" 1910 Cape 77mesReports629.
1956 (3)SA52 (A).
,3 See Phillipus Smit, Aspekte van die Wet op VvgafdryWng en Ste/sasie, 1975
Tydskrifvir Reg Wetskap 156, 157-9 (1976).
, COMMENTAPJUS AD PANDECTAS (1698-1704)47.11.3 (. Voet trans.)
I5 F.G. GARDINER & C.W.H. LASDOWNE, SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL LAW AND
12

PROCEDURE (6th ed. 1958).
16 J.C. DEWET & H.L SWANEPOEL, DIE SUID-AFKMNSE STRAFREG 217 (3d ed. 1975).
J.C. DEWET & H.L SWANEPOEL, DIE SUID-AFKAANSE STRAFREG 308 (1st ed. 1960).
J7
'8 Seeid. at 313.
'9 See MILTON, supra note 6, at 324.
20 See id.at 323.
21 See id
2
1913 T.P.D. 758.
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for attempted abortion.
Ifawoman is incited to have an abortion,24 or a third party is incited to
perform the abortion,' then the person responsible for the incitement can be
an
prosecuted.' If a person is prosecuted for inciting a woman to perform
2
abortion on hersel, the woman cannot be found liable as an accomplice. 7
If a woman dies while undergoing an abortion, the abortionist
performingthe illegal abortion can be charged with murder or culpable homicide,
in addition to being prosecuted for performing the abortion.' A backstreet
abortionist or a doctor who performs abortions for money will, Hunt suggests,29
receive a heavy sentence." Where the woman has consented to the abortion,
she isalso liable as a soc/us.3 ' It has been suggested that a man who makes a
woman pregnant andthen "callously incites herto have an abortion," will also be
severely dealt with, 2

III. PRESSURE FOR LEGISLATION
While the common law was dear that an abortion could take place to
save the life of the mother,3 there was considerable confusion about whether
an abortion could legally occur in other circumstances.3 4 Before the 1975
Abortion and Sterilization Act was passed, no legislation existed as faras abortion
was concemed (except for various sections in the Native Territories Penal Code
Act 24 of 1886), and there was no reported case that defined what the legal
SSee Rv Owen, 1942 AD. 389,394-5; Rv Davies, 1956 (3)SA 52 (AD) 59;' and R
vO, 1963 (I)SA43 (SR)45..
24 RvVoges, 1958(I)SA412(C).
SeeRvC, 1961 (3)SA675 (SR).
26 See HuNT, supra note 6, at 327.
27 SeeRvVoges, 1958 (I) SA412(C)417.
"eeRvHine, 1910 C.P.D371;andseealsoRvChitate, 1968(2)PH H337(R).
Se
30

Hunt, supra note 6, at 328.
SeSvKing, 1971 (2) PHHI03 (T).

eRvFreestone, 1913 T.P.D758; seea oRvThielke, 1918 AD. 373, 378; see
a&oRvOwen, 1942 AD.389, 392; seeaso RvP, 1948 (4) SA 103 (C) 109; see alo
RvVoges, 1958 (I) SA412(C)417.
HUNT, supra note 6, at 328.
3Se

See Voet, supra note 14.

3 See Second Reading of the Abortion and Sterilization Bill, House of Assembly
H&arad, 12 Feb. 1975, Col. 60 1.
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grounds for an abortion were?' Strauss pointed out that there were many gaps
in the law?6 For example, the law was unclear as to whether an abortion was
permitted in instances where the child to be born would suffer from a mental
defect or be seriously deformed?7 This issue could not have been contemplated
by jurists of the past as it was only with subsequent advancement that medical
science could detect mental or physical defects prior to birth.
It was also unclear whether an abortion could be performed lawfully
where pregnaryy might constitute serious impairment of the mother's mental or
physical health. Saving the mothers life was the only ground for abortion
mentioned in the writings of old jurists.3" Strauss, however, believes that these
authorities did not outlaw abortions where there was a danger to the mother's
physical or menltl halth, stating that, "[n]owhere isit unequivocally stated that
abortion is justified only where it is necessary to save the very life of the
mother."4"
The courts described the common law pertaining to abortion, in 1971,
as a mine-field.' Justice Hiemstra recommended law reform to reflect societys
more tolerant view ofthe issue 2 The court in Van Dnten case also called for
the enactment of legjslation.43 Judicial attitude toward the law was reflected in
Republic Publications (Ply) Ltd v. Publicatons Control Board where Judge
Henning declined to deem undesirable a publication which supported abortion
legalization."

'
36

5eeHuNT, supranote 6,at 308 n.17.
SAS. Strauss, TherapeuticAbortoninSouth AfN=can Law, 85 S.AFR. LJ. 453,458

(1968).
37

Seeid at 461.

38

See e.g. JOHAN MOORMAN, VERJ-IANDEUNGE OVER DE MISDADEN EN DER SELVER

STRAFFEN 2.8.10 (1764).
39 THE SELECT COMMrrTEE ON THE ABORTION AND STERILZATION BILL, REPORT

61 (SC

8-73Xl 973).
40

Id

SvKlng, 1971 (2)PH HI103(THiemstraJ.).
42 SeeDZ, A ThohtoAbctbn,90 S.AFR. J.34(1973); seealsoSAS. Strauss,
0inminahAbo'onStatistics90S.AR. LJ. 184 (1973).
' Unreported but commented on in SAS. Strauss, Regxerding van Vrugafdqvdng:
Twe B angiwseende (isp-aake,35 T*Wif HeedendagseRomemnse Hollandse Reg
4,

56(1972).
44

1971(3)SA399(D).

1998

SOUTH AFRICA'S ABORTION LAWS

147

-In S v. KIng the court found the South African position very
unsophisticated in relation to regimes in other countries,4" but also found that
South African society was becoming more permissive towards abortion.46
Academics such as Milton and Boberg called for reform of the law, stating that
precision was needed in the formulation of circumstances which justified an
abortion.4 7 Hunt described the law as belonging to the "ultra-conservative
category' and as "locked inan ivory tower",49 suggesting that, "there cannot be
respect for a law which istotally divorced from social realities and social needs.""
The medical profession in the early 1970s was also vocal about the
need for clarity on which circumstances constituted grounds for an abortion.
Many felt they could be prosecuted for performing abortions because the law
was insufficiently dear."
Because lawyers and eminent doctors 2 had
complained and made demands for the enactment of legislation, stating that the
legal position was untenable, 3 the issue was investigated.
Again, as throughout patriarchal history, men, and particularly the male
medico-legal fratemity, controlled adjudication of the abortion issue. Emily
Moore noted in 1973 that "we have a celibate male religious hierarchy which
is in the fore-front of opposition to the full recognition of women as persons, a
male-dominated legislature and a male-dominated medical profession loathe to
relinquish their role as decision makers in this arena."' Concern about such
factors as the effects of backstreet abortions was of secondary importance to
these male reformists although there had been calls for many years from other
quarters forthe law to be reformed because of the injuries and deaths resulting

46

1971 (2) PH HI03 (T)213.
See id.at 214.

47

SeeJOHN MILTON, ANNUALSuRvEy 505 (1971); PAUL BOBERG, LAW OF PERSONS AND

4s

FAMILY 19 (1977).
48 HuNT, supra note 6, at 308.
49 /d at 307.
so Id'
-, See CAPE TIMES, May6, 1971.
S2 See MILTON, supra note 47, at 505-7.
' See Helen Bradford, Her Body, HerLfi, CosMOurAN, Ag. 1991, at 131; see

alo THE SELEcT COMMIrTEE ON THE ABORTION AND STERUZATION BILL, REPORT 64 n.60
(SC 8-73).

1 Emily Moore, TIME, January 29, 1973, at 30, quoted in T.P. Boulle, The
GynaecologicalAspectsofAbor'on, in THE GREAT DEBATE: ABORTION INTHE SOUTH
AFRICAN CONTEXT 206 (G.C. Oosthuizen et al. eds., 1974)[hereinafter THE GREAT
DEBATE].
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from backstreet abortions. Statistics reflect that 1,436 people were treated for
incomplete abortions from mid- 1958 to mid- 1959 at Groote Schuur Hospital,"5
and thatthere were 302 abortion-related deaths recorded in the Johannesburg
area from 1959 to 1964, yethis was not a major concern to male professionals
calling for enactment of an abortion law.
While the organized medical profession, in the main, were motivated
by concern for their own interests, there were individual doctors who focused
on the abortion issue within its wider context One such doctor was AC. Keast
who was then president ofthe Border Coastal Region of the Medical Association
of South Africa. He noted, '[o]ne of the main arguments in favor of legalizing
abortion and of extending its indications is that the present practice, based on
Hippocratic principles, encourages criminal abortion with all its attendant
hazards."56
In any event, as a result of the pressure from doctors and lawyers, a
private member's motion was tabled in Parliament in February 1972 by Dr. E.
Fisher, which called for a select committee to look into the question of
abortion. 7 The Abortion and Sterilization Bill was tabled a year later but was
referred to a select committee which could not finish its work. The committee
was then converted into a commission of inquiry, 9 consisting exclusively of
senior, white, male parliamentarians, with no representation of the gender most
affected by the abortion issue.' This isnot an unusual feature of the process of
abortion law enactment Estrich and Sullivan note:
The direct impact of abortion restrictions falls exclusively on a
class of people that consists entirely of women. Only women
getpregnant. Onlywomen have abortions. Onlywomen will
endure unwanted pregnancies and adverse health
consequences if states restrict abortions. Only women will
suffer dangerous, illegal abortions where legal ones are
unavailable. And only women will bear children if they cannot
obtain abortions. Yet every restrictive abortion law has been

S ee Strauss, supra note 36, at 453.
-6 A.C. Keast, TherapeugcAbortfons, 45 S.AFR. MED.J. 888 (1971).
57 House of Assembly Harsard 1"8 Feb. 1972, Col. 1410.
sa 15 of 1973.
"' See Proc R162 in GG3974 of 6 July 1973 (Reg Gaz 1812). Report of the
Commission of Inquiry into the Abortion and Sterilization Bill RP 68 of 1974.
o SeeBoBERG, supranote 47, at20 n.23.
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passed by a legislature in which men constitute a numerical
majority. And every restrictive abortion law, by definition,
contains an unwritten clause exempting all men from its
structures. 6'
However, the man who was to become Minister of Health argued in
1975 that women were not a necessary part of an investigation into abortion:
Women are not the only ones who have a responsibility in
regard to abortion. The hon. member for Houghton [Helen
Suzman] iscompletely mistaken. I can forgive her, because
she is the only member of this house who is a women, but
then she must not abuse her sex and her presence here to
raise a hue and cry on behalf of the women of South
Africa... One need not have women on a committee [to
investigate abortion] in order to determine what is right or
wrong... if one wanted to abolish capital punishment today,
surely one would not appoint a bunch of murderers to go into
the matter and to see whether it should be abolished.62
The attitude of some of the male politicians in Parliament towards
women and their ability to make decisions conceming themselves during
pregnancy is reflected in the view of Graham McIntosh, United Party Member
ofParliarentfor Pinetown, Natal, duringthe abortion debate. He stated, "[fGor
the first trimester of a woman's pregnancy she is,medically speaking, hormonally
drugged. Her hormone level isso high as to make it difficult for her to come to
a rational and sensible solution."*
A similarly sexist view was expressed during the parliamentary debate
by Dr. E.L Fisher, who declared, "A woman will comeand say 'I have been
raped. I think I may be pregnant Will you not do something for me please?'
There are a lot of cases like that Some of them were raped very easily, very
easily indeed."' In this ambience of extreme sexism, the male-dominated
S.R. Estrich & K.M. Sullivan, Aborfon Poifts: Wridng for an Audience ofOne, 138
U.PA. L.REv. 119, 153 (1989/90).
' LAP.A Munnik, House ofAssembly Hansard 12 Feb. 1975, Col. 659.
61

6

JUNE CoPE, AMATTEROF CHOIE: ABRTON LAw REFORM IN APARTHEID SOurH AFRICA

84(1993).
6 Dr. E.L Fisher, House of Assembly Hasrd 10 Feb. 1975, Col. 482.
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medico-legal profession maintained control of the abortion issue during the
investigative and draffingstages of the bill; four ofthe ten members of the select
committee, all men, were medical practitioners, and two were members of the
legal profession. The rest of the committee consisted of a pharmacist, an exminister of religion, an ex-policeman and a social worker.65
The South African governments position was articulated at the beginning
of the second reading of the bill when the Minister of Health stated that,
"[r]espect for the unborn child (fetus), recognition of the Christian views and
moral norms which characterize our country... and the fact that drastic action
will be taken against abortions performed
outside the legal provisions... should
"
be clearly reflected in the legislation. 6
The bill provided that an abortion could be performed by a medical
practitioner only:
a)where the continued pregnancy may endanger the life of the
woman concerned or may constitute a serious threat to her
physical health and two medical practitioners certify in writing
that the continued pregnancy might, in their opinion, so
endangerthe women concerned or so constitute a threat to
her health; or
b) where there isa substantial riskthatthe child to be born will
suffer from physical or mental abnormality of such a nature that
it will be seriously handicapped, and two medical practitioners
certify in writing that, in their opinion, based on medical
scientific grounds, there issuch a risk; or
c) where the fetus is alleged to have been conceived in
consequence of unlawful carnal intercourse; and
01two medical practitioners certify in writ.ng
(aa) in the case of rape or incest, and after
such interrogation of the woman as any of
them may deem necessary, that the

See House of Assembly Hansard 12 Feb. 1975, Col. 606.
House of Assembly Haward 15 Feb. 1975, Cots. 472-473.
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pregnancy is,on a balance of probability, due
to alleged rape or incest, as the case may be;
or
(bb) in the case of carnal intercourse which
is alleged to have been in contravention of
section 15 of the Immorality Act 23/57 that
the woman concerned is an idiot or
imbecile; and
(ii a certificate issued by a magistrate under

section 7(3) is produced to the medical
practitioner referred to in section 7(I).
The bill obtained the support of many, particularly the medical
profession, a representative of which stated that, "[t]he medical profession in
general does not favor abortion on demand." s7
This male, medico-legal domination was completely contrary to the
spirit of the investigation into abortion which took place in the United Kingdom.
The Lane Commission, appointed to investigate the abortion question in the
United Kingdom, was chaired by Mrs. Justice Lane and nine out of the other 15
appointees were women.
The experience in the United Kngdom ispertinent in this context as the
same conservative disposition among doctors was apparent there before the
1967 Act was passed. The British Medical Association and the Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists were vehemently opposed to abortion
performed for social reasons, citing ethical considerations as grounds for their
opposition when the 1967 Act was being discussed." However, afterthe Act
was passed, they became aware of the benefits of the changed policy, both for
women and for themselves.6 9 The number of complications resulting from
backstreet abortions fell rapidly. Treatment of these problems had been a major
source of consternation for doctors in the past, and as these problems were
largely eradicated bythe 1967Act doctors came to support this law.7' By 1975,

'6
61

G.C. Geldenhuys, in THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 54, at 27 n.76.
SeeD. MARSH & J. CHAmBERS, ABORTION Pourics 73 (1981); see also A. HODERN,

LEGAL ABORTION: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE

69 See id.at 78.

"o See id.

17 (1982).
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therefore, the British medical profession was active in its support for the 1967
7
law. '
InSouth Africa, as noted earlier, the medical profession supported the
local bill, largely for reasons ofself-interest but also because it reflected their own
conservative position. The chairman [sic] at the time of the Society of
Psychiatrists of South Africa, Professor Gillis, stated on behalf of psychiatrists in
this country, "[t]hey and I welcome this legislation. I think it isa tidy piece of
legislation. I do not know any psychiatrist who isopposed to it in principle."'
However, certain reservations about the bill were voiced by doctors
such as Dr. P. Bremer, who represented the South African Society of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists. He believed the psychiatric grounds for
abortion provided for in the bill to be its Achilles' heel, and suggested that this
provision would be the area that could be abused by women who wished to
obtain an abortion.' 3
Reaction to the bill from the legal profession was generally positive but
in some instances, was guarded and unclear. Professor Strauss, for example,
testifying before the select committee, acknowledged the hazards of backstreet
abortion, and stated, "[s]urely the law cannot forever remain insensitive to the
wretched plight of pregnant women in dire need of skilled medical aid, being
virtually forced to resortto desperate means."74 During the same proceedings,
however, Strauss went on to say:
[on conditionally supporting the proposed reform of our law,
it isnot without a certain degree of hesitation that I do so. It is
hard to shake of the uneasy feeling that once you ignore or
stretch a sacrosanct prindple you are taking the first step on the
path that leads back to the jungle .... I am definitely not in
favor of abortion on demand. These provisions are in my
respectful opinion realistic, yet not over-permissive.'
7, See id.at 75.
72

THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE ABORTION AND STERILIZATION BILL, REPORT 20-21

(SC 8-73).
'
Testrmony before The Select Committee on the Abortion and Steriliation BM, 33
(SC 8-73).
74
d.at 66.
75 Testmonybefore The Select Committee on the Abotion and Steilizaton B, 66
n.95 (SC 8-73Xstatement of SAS. Strauss); see also E.Harrison, Aborton: The Wnds
of Change Conound 1(2) NATAL U.L REv. 44, 48 (1973); Strauss, Aborton and the Law
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Writing in 1973, at the time that the bill was being debated, Armstrong stated
thatthe proposed legislation had atwofold purpose: to provide clarity and end
confusion as to when a lawful abortion could be performed, and to reduce the
number of backstreet abortions that were being performed. 76
Hawthorne, however, disagreed with Armstrong on the latter point,
suggestingthatthe government and the opposition concurred that no legislation,
however liberal, would reduce the number of backstreet abortions.' Strauss'
view was that the Act was "not designed to achieve total eradication of illegal
abortions," a comment that reveals the belief that the Act would have a major
impact on the number of bac~street abortions performed while not totally ending
them.7'
Armstrongs criticisms ofthe bill are, infact, similar to those that continue
to be made aboutthe Act today. He stated:
The bill is inquisitive, [and] it isthis very inquisitiveness which
results inthe bill losing sight of the social need for secrecy and
privacy, and thus it fails to alleviate the grave problem of backstreet abortion ... women are driven to illegal abortion by a
wealth of factors, i.e. reputation, good name, financial and
domestic circumstances, etc ....
Women need privacy,
immediacy and secrecy...."
Middleton suggested that countries which had relaxed their abortion
laws had begun to rethink this policy,' but the reverse was in fact the case.
Since the early 1970s, many countries have liberalized their abortion laws. In
fact, after surveying the laws of other countries, Armstrong concluded that the
bill would not reduce the number of backstreet abortions, stating, "[o]n the
balance of probability the bill isdoomed to fail in its social purpose." 8'

in South Aica, inTHE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 54, at 138.
7 See N.W. Armstrong, Aborton, The NewAbortion Bi/I- Medine and Society2
RESPONSA MERJDANA 247, 252 (1973).
7 Luanda Hawthorne, The C'i-ne ofAbort-n:A HistoricalandCompaatieStudy,
247(1982) (unpublished LLD. thesis University of Pretoria).
7 SAS. Strauss, Some Comments on the Abortion and Sterilization Act 2 of 1978 After
OneYear's Operation: LegalAspects, 1977S.AF Cm. L &CFmmINoLoGY 116, 117.
'9 Armstrong, supra note 76, at 254.
80 A.J. Middleton, Abolron, 1972 DE REBUS 397, 400.
8 Armstrong, supra note 76, at 253.
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Bella Schmahmann went further, noting that the bill, "will not eliminate
the disastrous activities of the backstreet abortionist because women intent on
abortion will go to any lengths to get it .... ." Reflecting the lack of input by
women, the bill took an extremely conservative stance, severely restricting the
circuntances in which an abortion might be performed. Extraordinarily enough,
however, Hawthorne argued that the severity of the Act was not rooted in the
fact that it was decided by men, but rather in the evidence heard by the
Commission which suggested that the electorate was conservative in its attitude
towards abortion.' But can this be true if,as was noted in Parliament, very few
women were prepared to give evidence, at least partly because of the male
make-up and bias ofthe commission?' In addition, according to Cope, very few
women in South Afica knewthat a law about abortion had been proposed, and
was being debated and considered by Parliament.' Cope states, "flittle, if any,
ofthe debate was published in the national press, and the average South African
woman remained ignorant of the legislation which was being considered .... "6
In addition, the fact that the electorate was white and Parliament was
therefore not representative of the population as a whole was of critical
importance. Moreover, those who gave evidence about the proposed law, the
doctors, lawyers and other interested parties, were white and hardly able to
present the views and attitudes of the community at large.
In any event, the evidence heard by the Commission was not all
conservative as Hawthorne would have it Cope suggests that the conclusions
drawn bythe commission failed to take account of the evidence submitted to it,
particularly the written evidence, 7 and that "a serious misrepresentation
appeared to have taken place." Asked to comment on this, Professor Tony
Mathews, Dean of the Law Faculty of the University of Natal, noted, "[i]n my
knowledge no precedent exists for a commission to have misrepresented the
facts in such a manner."'
Further confirmation of the Commission's failure to reflect the views of
individuals outside of government ideology isto be found in the opinions of a

' Bella Schmahmann inTHE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 54.
'
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See Hawthorne, supra note 77, at 239 n.179.
See CJ.S. Wainwright, House of Assembly Hanard 12 Feb. 1975, Col. 714.
Cope, supranote 63, at 14.
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Id. at 82.
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number of speakers at a symposium on abortion held in Durban during May
1973. They induded Dr. Betty Bennet, Ms. Bella Schmahmann, Dr. Pam
Sharratt and Dr. Norman Walker, all ofwhom were in favor ofa liberal approach
to a new law.9°
Focusing on the reality of abortion, Walker noted that
It is too late for cabinet ministers, church dignitaries or the
hierarchy of the legal and medical profession to decide there
will orwill not be abortion. That decision has long since been
taken. The women of the world, the women-at-risk, decided
all that irrevocably at least four thousand years ago. All that is
left for politicians, priests, lawyers and doctors isto be honest
with themselves, uncomfortably honest, eschew wishful
thinking, pious hopes, blatant hypocrisy, and boldly face fact.
Only one decision remains to be taken. Will the current
practice of abortion be permitted to remain the hazardous
aflair it certainly is now, or will it be made safe?91
Sharratt, agreeing with Walker's thrust and pleading for major revisions of the
law, stated, "MItfar too little attention isbeing paid, in the abortion debate, to the
best welfare of women, children and society at large. "'
Another response to the enactment of legislation was the establishment
of South Africa's first abortion-focused groups. The South African Abortion Law
Reform Group and the Abortion Reform Action Group (Arag) were founded in
the early 1970s, and amalgamated in 1976.' To lobby support for abortion
liberalization, the Group held meetings with various Members of Parliament
including Messrs. Van Hoogstraten, Oldfield, Fisher, Von Keyserlink, Van
ensburg, Dallingand Mrs Helen Suzman.4 In 1973, Arag presented a petition
signed by 1,500 people supporting legalization of abortion to the select

90 SeegeneralfrTHE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 54.
"
Norman Walker, Like Lemmings into the Sea, in id. at 199, 202-203.
'2
Pamela Sharratt, Socia, Peisonal and Psychoogical Indications for Legalised
Abortons, in id.at 112-113.
'
Annual General Meeting minutes ofthe South African Abortion Law Reform League
18 August 1976.
4 Annual General Meeting minutes of the South Aican Abortion Law Reform League
12June 1975.
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committee,' while a Durban group of activists collected 10,000 signatures to a
similar petition after only 22 hours of effor L ' However, reflecting government
attitude and predisposition, the Minister of Health refused to see a deputation
from the groups that had organized the petition, stating that the matter had
already been considered by the select committee.
The select committee did investigate the bill and produce a report but,
as noted earlier, the committee gave way to a commission of inquiry whose
shortcomings have been discussed. The Abortion and Sterilization Bill was tabled
in Parliament in 1974 and debated in February 1975. The bill was adopted by
both houses, signed by the State President and published on March 12, 1975.97

W. THE ABORTION AND STERIUZATION ACT
From 1975, abortions in South Africa were permitted only in terms of
the provisions of the Abortion and Sterilization Act.
The Act specifically
stipulated that an abortion could take place only when the stringent requirements
of the Act were met." Nevertheless, although it was very conservative
legislation, the Act widened the grounds on which a legal abortion could be
procured. Thus, Boberg saw the Act as "largely declaratory and explanatory of
the common law"" ° while Bertrand complained that, "certain provisions are
dangerously more permissive than Judeo-Christian principles allow in that the
objective and intrinsic human worth and rights of the unborn child have in some
cases, been
overruled by subjective values and rights of the mother or
"
society. "'

Others have argued that the Act did nothing to look after the interests
of the "unborn child" and that no one looked after the interests of the fetus. "
Others called forthe appointment of an independent person such as an advocate

'

NEWSLETTER (S.Air. Abortion L Reform League, Cape Town) 1974, at 2.

96See

SeeA.R.L Bertrand, TheAbortion and SteriizatonAct2 of/975: A thirdopinion
(Part/I) 1978 MACC264.
Act 2 of 1975.
Seeid. § 2.
,00 BoBERG, supra note 47, at 20.
,o1 Bertrand, supra note 97, at 284-85.
,o See Lourens Du Plessu,
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falelWJ
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or attorney to represent and defend the "rights" of the fetus. " They argued that
this would be analogous to the appointment of a curator ad litem where the
interests of a minor child are at stake."X°
Van Oosten suggests, by contrast, that the Act aims to continue
pregnancy rather than to protect the fetus. " This is a suggestion that lends
credence to the argument that the intention of the Act was to play a part in
fostering growth in the white birth rate.
Criticism has also been levelled at the Act on the basis that it is unclear
about what abortion is. Within the English version of the Act, which is the
version signed by the State President, abortion is circularly defined as "the
abortion of a live fetus of a woman with intent to kill such a fetus.""°6 It isseen
to be problematic that the drafters ofthe legislation chose to define abortion by
usingthe word "abortion," thereby creating ambiguity. The Afrikaans version of
the Act defines abortion as, " v afd y w ngis: die afdwing van ' lewende vrug
van n vrou met die opset om dit te dood"
This use of the word "afdryWng (expulsion), does confer some clarity
on the definition of abortion. Therefore, although the English text was the one
signed b/the State President and thus the text to be used for interpretation, the
Afrikaans version was used in Sv. Collopto clarify the English text.10z This was
the solution proposed by Van Oosten who argued that the Afrikaans version
must supply the meaning of abortion intended by the Act." Therefore, it was
the expulsion and not the killing of a fetus which transgressed the law 1 9 That
is,ifthere was a killing of the fetus but expulsion was not caused, there would be
no transgression of the Abortion Act." 0 Further, if labor was not induced, that
is,if vacuum aspiration was used, this would not constitute an abortion in terms
ofthe Act....
Yet another problem with the Act was its use ofthe term "fetus" without
defining its meaning. InSv. Kuger,Judge Erasmus held that "lewende vrue and

10 See G v Superintendent, Groote Schuur Hospital, and others 1993 (2) SA255 (C).
,04 See B.Bertrand, The South African Abortion Act - An Assault on the image of God
I I (Feb. 1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
'0 Ferdi van Oosten, Regmabge Vrngafdrying, 1977 DEJURL337, 378.
,o Act 2 of 1975 § I.
107 1981 (1)SA I50(A).
'~ SeeVan Oosten, supranote 105, at 377.
'0 See Smit, supra note 13, at 158-9; see asoVan Oosten, supra note 105, at 377.
110See HUNT, supra note 6, at 323.
...
See Smit, supranote 13, at 158-9.
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"live fetus' mean the same thing."' The court held further, that the
promulgation ofthe Abortion and Sterilization Act had repealed the common law
relating to abortion. This view was supported in both the lower and appellate
court decisions of S v. Collop,where it was argued that, medically speaking, the
term "embryo" isused for the first eight weeks after conception, and the term
"fetus"thereafter." 3 However, the court found that for the purposes of the Act,
there is no distinction between these terms, that a "fetus' exists conceptually
from the moment of conception, and that any interference with the fetus from
conception would transgress the Act." 4 The Appellate Division concurred,
defining fetal life as beginning at conception."s
Forthe crime of abortion to have occurred, the following elements must
be present (I) expulsion from a woman (2) of a live fetus (3) unlawfully (4) with
the intention of killing the fetus. There is no express requirement that the fetus
must die butthis, it issuggested, isimplied by the Act."6 The Act stipulates that
abortion is permitted only:
(a) where the continued pregnancy endangers the life of the
woman concerned or constitutes a serious threat to her
physical health, and two other medical practitioners have
certified in, writing that, in their opinion, the continued
pregnancy so endangers the life of the woman concerned or
so constitutes a serious threat to her physical health and
abortion isnecessaryto ensure the life or physical health of the
woman;
(b)where the continued pregnancy constitutes a serious threat
tothe mental health of the woman concerned, and two other
medical practitioners have certified in writing that, in their
opinion, the continued pregnancy creates the danger of
permanent damage to the woman's mental health and
abortion is necessary to ensure the mental health of the
woman;

1976 (3)SA 290 (0)295-6.
"' 1979(4)SA381 (0); seel981 (1)SA 150(A).
"14 166H-67E
"' See Tichael Lupton, The LegdStatus ofthe Enbyo, 1988 AcrAJURiDrcA 197, 207.
116 See Bertrand, supra note 97, at 265.
112
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(c) where there exists a serious risk that the child to be bom
will suffer from a physical or mental defect of such a nature that
he [sic] will be irreparably seriously handicapped, and two
other medical practitioners have certified in writing that, in their
opinion, there exists, on scientific grounds, such a risk; or
(d) where the fetus is alleged to have been conceived in
consequence of unlawful carnal intercourse, and two other
medical practitioners have certified in writing after such
interrogation ofthe woman concerned as they or any of them
may have considered necessary, that in their opinion the
pregnancy isdue to the alleged unlawful carnal intercourse; or
(e) where the fetus has been conceived in consequence of
illegitimate carnal intercourse, and two other medical
practitioners have certified in writing that the woman
concerned is due to a permanent mental handicap or defect
unable to comprehend the consequential implications of or
bearthe parental responsibility forthe fruit of coitus." 7
These grounds for legal abortion are examined below.
A Life andHealth ofthe Mother
Section 3(I Xa) reenacts the common law which permits abortion to
save the life ofthe mother. However, it was more restrictive than the common
law because ofthe additional procedures that were required by the Act. Indeed,
the Act was couched in exacting terms whose purpose was precisely to ensure
additional restrictions. For instance, there must be a serious threat to the
woman's physical health before an abortion was permitted, whereas the 1973
bill merely required the possibility that the pregnancy might endanger or threaten
such health." 8
The use of the term "serious" in this dause, as well as the "mental
health" clause, has been criticized by Smit on the grounds that it was too

Act2of 1975 §3(I).
,,l See Bertrand, supra note 97, at 275.
"7
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vague." 9 Hawthorne inturn criticizes Smit for taking an attitude which "exposes
a sad lack oftrust in the integrity of the legal profession."' 20 The issue, however,
isnot so much one of integrity, but rather the restrictive effect of the wording of
the section. The statistics reveal how seldom this section was invoked, thereby
indicatingthe strict application of its terms by doctors who were able to authorize
abortions.
B. Mental Heath ofthe Motherand the Fetus
The mental health clause of the 1975 Act shows a similar narrowing of
the formulation inthe 1973 bill. It requires that there be a danger of permanent
damage to the mental health of a woman seeking an abortion. 2' The
extremeness of this requirement functions so as to almost nullify, in practice,
access to abortion in terms ofthis clause.
Comparable constraints exist in the section permitting abortion on the
grounds of a serious physical or mental defect that would result in a child that was
irreparably, seriously handicapped. The 1973 bill required merely a substantial
risk. Here again, the earlier formulation was tightened, again reducing the
opportunities for access to abortion.'"
Critidsm of the wording of the "mental health" clause came from
different quarters. Helen Suzman, Member of Parliament, for example,
attempted to replace the word "permanent" with 'serious," but this was
rejected." The resulting exceedingly stringent requirements practically abolish
access to an abortion on the grounds of protecting the woman's mental health. 24
A further difficulty when an abortion was requested on the grounds of
mental health, isthat one of the medical practitioners who must be consulted
must be a psychiatrist in the employ of the state.' s This isanother departure
from the 1973 bill which empowered an ordinary psychiatrist to authorize an
abortion' The restrictive effect of this requirement isdear when one notes that
in 1976 there were only 137 state-employed psychiatrists in South Africa, of

,,Smit, supranote 13, at 161.
20 Hawthorne, supra note 77, at 260.
121 See Bertrand, supra note 97, at 275.
12 See id.at277.
'" Seethe Second Reading of the Abortion and Sterilization Bill House of Assembly
Hansard12 Feb. 1975, Col. 605.
'2 As isevident from the modest number of legal abortions that occured.
,25Act 2 of 1975 § 3(3)(b).
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whom23 certified that an abortion was necessary. 26 In 1977 there were
135
27
state-employed psychiatrists of whom only 33 signed such certificates.'
Even more critical was the impact, or rather lack thereof, of this
requirement on the plight of black women. Women of color had little access to
psychiatrists from their own communities. In 1973, in response to a question
about the number of "colored or Bantu" psychiatrists in the country, the
chairman [sic] of the Society of Psychiatrists replied that there was one colored
psychiatrist practicing at Groote Schuur hospital.'" Indeed, psychiatrists of any
description are hard to come by for the vast majority of South Africans, as Helen
Suzman pointed out in Parliament, "I am told there isonly one single psychiatrist
inthe homelands or, rather, nearthe homelands, he isin Mafeking and not even
in a homeland. There is hardly a single psychiatrist between Pretoria and the
"
Limpopo. 129
As for women who live in semi-urban areas such as Pietersburg, access
to a psychiatrist was barely easier, though this did not trouble the Chair of the
Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, who opined that there was no
problem as, "sy gaan net13 na
die priate geneesheer, wat haar na die
°
verwMs.
distni7sgeneesheer
No consideration was given to the cost implication of this situation, and,
more importantly, the needs of women living in the rural areas were ignored.
This reflects the bias against black women and it is hardly surprising that there
was the vewthat, "the present abortion legizIation reflects the values and norms
3
of the whites."' '
In light ofthe obsltaces erected by this clause, it is interesting that about
half of all legal abortions were nonetheless performed for psychiatric reasons,' 32
the majority on white women at Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town.'3 3

'='

House of Assembly Hansard 1977 Col. 1410.
House of Assembly Hansard1978 Col. 924.
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" Helen Suzman, House of Assembly Hansard 10 Feb. 1975, Col. 401.
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THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THEABoR'ION AND STERILIZATION BILL, REPORT 34

(SC

8-73).
' Ferdi van Oosten & Monica Ferreira, Republic ofSouth Afca inINTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOKONABORTION 416,422 (P.Sachdeved., 1988).
'32 See L Luti &M.Mamaila, T7ne to CTwgeAbortion Laws, CITY PRESS, July 14, 1991.
'" eeS.Taylor, ASixYear RevwofLegalAbortions Performed in aTeaching Hospital

(1986) (unpublished MA thesis, University of Cape Town).
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Therefore, it must be asked whetherwhite women were more likely than others
to suffer the efiects of psychiatric illness, and whether women from Cape Town
were more ill than their counterparts in the rest of the country. The answer is
surely one of access to abortion at some hospitals as a result of a progressive
attitude among doctors at these institutions.
C Rape and Incest
Section 3(lXd) was originally used to permit abortions in cases of incest,
rape or sex in violation of section 15 of the Immorality Act, which prohibited
sexual intercourse with a girl who was an imbedle or idiot
Section 3(lXd) as amended, permited abortion only where rape or
incest has occurred. Where pregnancy results from sexual intercourse with a girl
underthe age of 16, termed stalutory rape, an abortion was not provided for by
the Act34 An abortion in the case of statutory rape was rejected in the debate
in Parliament on the basis that:
it is possible for such a gil who in a moment of indiscreet
passion and emotion, finds herself in such a situation, to
contract a legal marriage; in fact, two years ago we made it
possible for a girl to marry atthe age of 15 years withoutthe
need for ministerial permission. 3
Incest was defined in the Abortion and Sterilization Act as, "camal intercourse
between two persons who are related to each cither and by reason of such
relationship incompetentto marry each other.'
An abortion was permitted where the parties to the pregnancy were
related to each other by affinity, consanguinity or adoption.3 6 There is,
however, a dispute as to what the effect was where the parties did not know

" See J.C. Stassen, Die Wet op Vrugafdoy'dng en Sterisasie 2 van 1975, 1976
The meaning of the rape clause as well as the
procedures to be followed by awoman who has been raped were investigated by the
court in G vSuperintendent Groote Schuur Hospital 1993 (2) SA 255 (C).
, H.J. Coetzee, House of Assembly Hansard 12 Feb. 1975, Col. 613.
TXmMFViRSuiDASYAA" REG 260,263.

'3'See Desiree Hanson and Diana Russell, Made to F7- The Mythical Option ofLegal
Abortbn For Surivors ofRape andlncest,9 S.Am.J. HUm. RTs. 500,518 (1994); see
also Michael Lupton, Medico - LegaIAspect, inFAMILY LAw SEIMCEJ54 (Ivan Schaefer
ed., 1994).
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they were related.'37

The Act stipulates that when abortion was sought on the ground of rape
or incest, one ofthe certifing medical practitioners must be the district surgeon
38
who examined the woman where a complaint was lodged with the police.'
Further, a magistrate must issue a certificate' 39 specifyng:
(a) that the police have been informed, or the reason why
not; 40
(b) that after examining the woman and whatever other
evidence, on the balance of probability the pregnancy is the
result of rape or incest;
(c) that if the abortion is as a result of incest, then the degree
of relationship transgresses the laws of incest;
(d) thatthe woman has submitted an affidavit, or sworn under
oath that the pregnancy isthe result of rape or incest.
Kunst and Meiring report that magistrates issued a certificate only if the
police had been informed and ifthe medical evidence showed that rape or incest
was the cause of the pregnancy.' 4'
The reality of the situation was that in most cases, neither rape nor
incest victims report these occurrences since they fear a whole host of
consequences. In addition to the trauma of rape or incest, women endure the
burden of societ/s attitudes. Responsibility for pregnancy, even in the case of
rape or incest, was almost exclusively imposed on the woman. Such attitudes
had ramifications in terms of the law. For instance, the law imposed no
requirements on the state to provide counselling or support of any kind to
victims of rape or incest.

See Hunt, supra note 6, at 319; see also Stassen, supra note 134, at 263.
'38 Act 2 of 1975 § 3(3Xc).
'39 SeeGvSuperintendent, Groote Schuur Hospital, and others 1993 (2) SA255 (C).
,4 Act 2 of 1975 § 6(4Xa).
'.' Jennifer Kunst & Rita Meiring, Abortion law - A need for Reform, DE REBUS June
1984, at 264, 265; see also G v Superintendent, Groote Schuur Hospital, and others
1993 (2) SA255 (C).
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The complicated bureaucratic process of obtaining permission for an
abortion was the antithesis ofa system which safeguarded and promoted physical
and mental health. Manywomen who would have been entitled to an abortion,
even within the rigid restrictions of the Act, often resorted to backstreet
abortions because of the insensitive procedural requirements which took no
account of an already traumatized woman's need for immediacy, empathy and
confidentiality.'42 Women, quite simply, did not wish to navigate the cold
passages of the bureaucracy ofthe police and the courts.
Much criticism has been levelled at the procedures necessary to obtain
an abortion, some of which existed even before the bill became law. Arag stated
in its memorandum to the select committee, u01n the consideration of a rape
victim, the procedure demanded by the legislation - that of a woman seeing in
all, four doctors, the police, a magistrate, and writing an affidavit to the magistrate
who in turn has authority to question her, isnothing short of inhuman."'4 3
The Law Commission investigated these questions in 1985 " and held
discussions with those who apply the procedures in the case of rape. The
Commission noted that, while the majority of respondents favored the
procedures, 4 ' members of the South African Police asserted that one of the
major causes ofadditional traumato a woman who had been raped was the fact
that she had to appear personally before a magistrate. According to these police
officers, this was not necessary as an affidavit could be given by the police to the
magistrate. 4 6 Members of the South African Police and the magistrates in
particular, favored a procedure that caused less trauma to the women
147
involved.

While the Law Commission noted the views of the police and
magistracy, 148 the Commission nonetheless held:

,42 See Strauss, supra note 78, at 117 (commenting on the lack of confidentiality); see
ako Kunst & Meiring, supa note 141, at 265 (commenting on the procedural problems).
, Memorandum to the Select Committee on the Abortion and Sterilisation Bill from
the Abortion Reform ActionGroup, d'edin Bertrand, supra note 97, at 279 (arguing that
the criticism isunfounded).
'44
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Id at 4.83.
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it is not clear how the present procedure can humiliate
her.... The only personal contact... isthe examination by
the district surgeon and reporting to the police"".... [and]
... appearing before a magistrate is not obligatory since in
terms of sec 6(4XaXii) the magistrate must interrogate either
the victim or any other person. °
But who else would the magistrate have wished to "interrogate'? How many
people were usually present at a rape? Would a magistrate have really wanted
to interrogate a person other than the victim?
The Commission nonetheless suggested the elimination of the personal
appearance requirement' and stated that it should not have been obligatory to
interrogate the woman who had been raped. It also noted that the decision
whether to grant an application for an abortion after rape should rest in the
hands of a trained multi-disciplinary team attached to a provincial hospital. This
team should have consisted of, medical practitioners, a forensic scientist, social
workers, a representative of the SAP and a representative of a rape crisis
service."'
Inthe alternative, if this was not acceptable, the Commission held that
the decision ofthe magistrate should be assisted by the recommendation of such
The Commission also suggested that the "victim" (or any other
a team.'
person, for example a relative, husband or member of a rape crisis organization)
be able4to apply directly to the magistrate without the involvement of the
5
police.'
The Commission drew attention to the view that a woman who had
been raped oughtto be able to "claim an automatic right to an abortion and this
service should be rendered free of charge to victims (that is to say at state
expense)."'
In spite of all these recommendations and proposals, the Law
nevertheless
found that the then status quo should have been
Commission
56
maintained.
149

Id at 4.91 n.70.

,s Id at 4.91.
Is' Id at 4.93.

Id.at 5.54.
Id.at 4.93.
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D. Stingent Procedures
In addition to the conditions laid down in section 3(l), stringent
procedures stipulated byhe Act had to be meticulously complied with to obtain
an abortion. 5 7 In effect, this limited access to abortion as there was insufficient
information available to women about the requisite procedures. Language also
played a key part in reducing access for women who do not speak either of the
former two official languages, English and Afrikaans.
There were not many requests for abortion from black women as they
do not know about its availability.' Soon after the Act came into force Strauss
noted, that there had been very few applications by African women.'S9 Part of
the reason was fearthat the record of the application for a termination would be
used lateras evidence in a criminal case when no child is born. This perception
continued to exist as it was known by women that less than halfthe applications
for abortions were granted. 6" But in spite of these fears, those who were
refused permission to have an abortion went to the backstreets. "'
The Act permited an abortion to be performed only by a medical
practitioner. However a doctor could refuse to perform the abortion on the
basis of a conscience clause which was included in the Act. 62 At first glance the
language used in this clause does not appear problematic, but it is,in practice,
since doctors who refuse to perform an abortion were not required to refer
women to other practitioners who would render this service."
Ifa doctor performed an abortion in an emergency, without complying
with the requirements ofthe Act, in order to save the life of a woman, he or she
was subject to criminal sanction. The defense of necessity could have been
available in these circumstances, however.'" An abortion carried out by a health
professional who was not a medical practitioner, as defined by the Act, would

'Se .eGvSupeintendent,

Groote Schuur Hospital, and others 1993 (2) SA255 (C).
Jan.7 1987.
, 9 Strauss, supranote 78, at 117.
"60 SeeWEEUY MAIL, Nov. 6-12, 1992.
SSeeTHESTAR,

,61 SeeTHEESTAR,supranote 158.
'6

Act2 of 1975, § 9.

SeeSteve Taylor, supra note 133, at I I; see atso Sarah Jane Drower, A Survey of
Patients Referred for Therapeutic Abortion on Psychiatric Grounds in a Cape Town
Provincial Hospital 65 (1977) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Cape Town).
'"' See Ferdi van Oosten, Aborion -Adieu Common Law?, 93 S.AFR. LJ. 393, 394
(1976); see Bertrand, supra note 97, at 284-5 n. 120.
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also transgress the law."6 The defense of necessity could not have been invoked
in these circumstances."
A further procedural requirement of the Act was that a doctor
performing an abortion had to do so in a hospital designated by the Minister of
Health as a place where abortions could be performed. 67 The person in charge
of the hospital was required to give written approval for the abortion'"
subsequent to a doctor's request for such permission, a request which had to set
outa myriad of details 69 for the hospital superintendent, who must then report
such details to the Director-General of Health. 7 ° Two additional, independent
doctors, not in partnership with the original doctor or in the employ of the same
employer, '' had to attestto the legitimacy ofthe grounds for the abortion'" and
could not have participated in the abortion. " At least one of these doctors was
required to have been in practice for at least four years. 74
Further, the certifying doctor was not permitted to perform the
operation. This limited a woman seeking an abortion even further as she could
not decide to let her own doctor do the termination.T"
Prescribed forms had to be used by the various individuals who had to
give permission and bythose who had to checkthe legitimacy of the grounds for
the abortion. The extent to which these requirements limited access has been
noted by Dr. Marj Dyer, who suggested that black women "would never be able
to wade through the welter of man-devised forms and certificates required." 76
Bertrand replied correctly that it was the doctor who had to complete the
necessary forms' 7 but Dyers statement istrue in so far as women, especially

,6s See Hunt, supranote 6, at 316.
16 See id. at 317.
" SeeAct 2 of 1975 § 5.
168 See id § 6(lIXa ) .
169-W id § 6(2).
"7 See id.§ 7. This has to indude name, age, marital status, race, place where and
when the abortion was done, the reasons therefore, and the names and qualifications of
the doctors involved at any stage. See i.
3 (2Xa) .
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Sge id

17

See id.§ 3(1 Xa), (b), (c)and (d).
See id § 3 (2Xa).

'73

174

§

See id. § 3(3Xa).

See Kunst & Meiring, supra note 141, at 265.
,76 Mar Dyer, CAPE TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1975
In Bertrand, supra note 97, at 264.
"
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black women, had immense difficulty navigating all the obstacles placed in the
way of obtaining an abortion, even when they met the strict requirements of the
Act in regard to the circumstances in which abortion was permitted.
Each step of the process required by the Act placed the onus for
organization, time and finance on the woman in crisis. This had obvious
repercussions for working women, economically disadvantaged women, and
those living in rural areas where finding any doctor is a struggle. Job security is
of major concern for many women, especially those in the agricultural and
domestic fields who did not have statutory protection and were guaranteed
'neither maternity leave nor the sick leave necessary for the numerous
appointments which were prerequisites for obtaining an abortion. 78 The
women who were hit hardest were black," those who have been excluded
from the benefits of the law and included into the lowest social and economic
class because of their race and gender.
The Law Commission refused to acknowledge the fact that the
complicated procedures required by the Act compelled women to endure
backstreet abortions. " The difficulty of obtaining an abortion, even for those
few women whose circumstances were covered by the Act, lead thousands of
women to the backstreets, at great risk to their health and lives.
Parliament was no more willing than the Law Commission to
acknowledge the discriminatory effect of the law. When it was being enacted it
was stated in Parliament that the "rich have always been able to do what the
poor could not, however when it comes to abortion there is talk of
discrimination."'
Similarly, Noonan has stated that it isa:
sad and harsh probability that a large number of criminal laws
bear with unequal severity in practice on the poor, who are
more likely than the rich to be caught, to be prosecuted, to be
unskillfully defended, to be convicted and to be punished.

'7" SeeJAcKLYN COCKEAL, CHILD CARE AND THE WORKING MOTHER: A SOCIOLOGICAL
INVESTIGATION OFA SAMPLE OF URBAN AFRCAN WOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA 45-48, 69-80

(1983); see aLso JACLYN COC, MAIDS AND MADAMs: A STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF
EXPLOITATION 260 (1984); see afso Barabara. Kiugman, The Polits of Contraception
inSouth Afica, 13 WOMEN'S STUDIES INTERNATIONAL FORUM 261, 265 (1990).

'" SeeVan Oosten & Ferreira, supra note 13 1,at 423.
"'o LAW COMMISSION, supra note 144, at 4.97.
,8, Dr. E.L Fisher, House of Assembly Hanard 10 Feb 1975, Col. 480.
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These de facto defects in a system of law are reasons to urge
reform of the administration of criminal justice and not for the
selective invalidation of criminal statutes.18
These comments ail to take into account the realities of South African
society where a person's economic class is very often dependent on that
person's race, because the privileges and opportunities available to white people
have not been available to others.
Abortion was thus more accessible to wealthy women who, because
of apartheid, tended to be white. Those with money were more able than their
impoverished counterparts to find doctors willing to perform safe abortions,
thereby avoidingthe badcstreets. One avenue for wealthy women was to travel
overseas to have the procedure performed. A number of women resident in
South Africa, almost exclusively white, went to England and Wales to have
abortions. Official numbers recorded are 560 in 1983, 609 in 1985, 517 in
1986, 447 in 1987, 400 in 1988 and 439 in 1989,'83 but it was suggested that
the real figure was at least double the official number, as many South African
women give a local address ratherthan a South African one."e This racial aspect
to abortions performed abroad was noted in 1987 when the Pregnancy Advisory
Servmces ofthe Charlotte Street Clinic in London, refused to continue to permit
white South African women to come to the dinic to have abortions. The dinic
stated thatthese women were the fortunate ones who, because of the situation
in South Africa, were able to afford the travel costs."8 In the light of the
foregoing, therefore, it was not remarkable that backstreet abortion was an
option resorted to frequently by South African women."

V. LEGALABORTiONS

With all the limitations and p.ocedural complexities imposed by the Act,
itwas not surprisingthatthe number of legal abortions carried out in terms of the

18

THE MORALUT OFABORTION- LEGALAND HisToRr-AL PERSPECTiVES 237 (].
Noonan

ed., 1970).
'83SeeB. Botting,' Trends in Abortion, 64 POPULATION TRENDS 19,20 (1991).
' See NEWSLE1rER(Abortion Reform Action Group) Oct. 23, 1983.
's See NEWSLEtER(Abortion Reform Action Group) Aug. 1987.
'8 See Helen Rees, Women and Reproducte Nghts, in PurriNG WOMEN ON THE
AGENDA 213 (Susan Bazilli ed., 1991).
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Act were paltry. A demographic breakdown of the data revealed that the
women who braved illegal, backstreet abortions in South Aica were mostly
from a low socio-economic background, under-educated 87 and stereotypically
young, unmarried, black women living in urban townships. The majority of
women who obtained legal abortions were white women from more privileged
socio-economic backgrounds.
TABLE I
PACIAL BREAKDOWN OF LEGABORTIONS PERFORMED
DURING THE FIRSTYEARS OFTHEACT.

1975
485
21
56
8
570

Whites
Blacks
Coloureds
Asians
TOTALS

1977
399
46
78
16
539

1976
509
28
77
II
625

In the first year of the Act, 570 legal abortions were effected, almost
exclusively within the white population." The same was true for legal abortions
performed in subsequent and more recent years. For example, in the period
from November 1984 to October 1985, 712 legal abortions were performed
in South Afica. Ofthe women undergoingthese abortions, 78.7 percent were
white, 11. 1 percent were colored, 4.9 percent were Asian and 5.3 percent were
black.'"9 During this same period (1985). 609 South African women had
abortions in the United Kingdom, putting South Africa fourth on the list of source
countries ofwomen who travelled to the United Kingdom specifically to have an
90
abortion.'
The figures for legal abortions in the year ending June 3 1, 1989, show
thatthe racial trend remained constant, with 735 (76.3 percent) of a total of 963
legal abortions performed on white women.' 9' In 1992, 1,449 legal abortions
1'

Seegenera-y Derek Larsen, InducedAborion, 53 S.Am MED.J. 853 (1978).

181 See JANET

WESTmORE, ABORTION IN SouTH AFRICA AND ATTrrUDES OF MEDICAL

PRACTITONERS TOWARDS SOUTHAFRicAN ABORTION LEGALITIES 9

(1977).

,89 See David Bourne, Abortons in England and Wales on South Af"can Residents, 74
S.AFRL MED.J. 87 (1988).
190

See id

191Seegenea/ 1989 DEPT. OF HEALTH AND POPULATION DEV. ANN. REP.
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occurred, of which 1,002 or 69.2 percent were on white women.1 In 1993,
untilthe end of November, 1,301 legal abortions were performed of which 868,
or 66.7 percent, were performed on whites." 3 These figures reflectthe racial
and economic barriers to access abortion.
Ifthe intent of the Act was to restrict access to abortions, then it was a
dismal failure, as evidenced by the various strategies employed to circumvent its
provisions. For example, there were suggestions that retinoids were being used
as a pretext to obtain a legal abortion. Retinoids used in the treatment of acne
are known to cause fetal disorders. When doctors were told that patients had
taken this drug, they felt bound to authorize an abortion. Another example was
the use of Rubella vaccines by pregnant women for the same purpose. The
difference between actual German measles, a disease that causes fetal defects,
and a higher antibody count resulting from the vaccine, cannot easily be
detected.

Vi. BACKSTREEABORTIONS
Very little research has been done on illegal abortions in South Mrica,"
but it was estimated that every year between 100,000 and 500,000 women had
a backstreet abortion in the country.'9
In 1975, the number of bac6street abortions was estimated to be about
250,000.' 6 In 1982, Grobler calculated that 200,000 were performed annually,
while in the same year,97 Brown suggested that conservative estimates of the
number of illegal abortions was 200,000 a year."' In the 1990s, Erica
Greathead, Director of the Family Planning Association of South Africa, stated

192
'

Seegeneral, 1992 DEPT. OF HEALTH AND POPULATION DEV. ANN. REP.
See generally 1993 DEPT. OF HEALTH AND POPULATION DEv. ANN. REP.

9 See Van Oosten & Fereira, supra note 13 1, at 420.
SeeJeremy Sarldn, A PerspecMe on Aborton in South Africas Bil ofRights Em 56
Tydskrifvir Heedendagse Rom efnse Ho/lande Reg83 (1993).
'" See M.G.T. Cloete, Abatbn:A CniminologicalReview,in THE GREAT DEBATE, supra
note 54, at 146; see also THE CAPE TIMES, Feb. 13, 1975, at II; see also CJ.S.
'

Wainwright, House of Assembly Hansard 12 Feb. 1975, Col. 715; see also Maj Dyer,
SUNDAYTIMES, Nov. 3, 1974, at 10.
"p House of Assembly Hanard, Mar. 1982, Cols. 2023-2024.
'9

B. Brown, Fa)ng the 'Black Peil" The Poltcs ofPopulation Control in South Africa

13 J. OF S. AFm STUDIES 267 (1987).
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that 500,000 backstreet abortions were performed in South Africa each year.'"
The Law Commission in 1985 was willing to accept that only 15,000
women had backstreet abortions each year.2' However, it seems that this
figure was based on an estimate of the number of women who had abortions
after being raped. The Law Commission itself stated that the figure of 15,000
was based on figures suggested atthe fiflh national conference of Rape Crisis held
in April 1984201 and derived from the "assumption' that 150,000 rapes per
annum occur in South Mica" and that 10 percent of rape victims fall pregnant" °
Table 2 compares the number of legal abortions performed annually
with the total of reported "operations for removal of residues of pregnancy",
which was only one of the commonly used alternative channels to achieve an
abortion. 3
TABLE2
LEGAL ABOR'ONS

Legal Abortions
1975
570
1976
625
1977
539
1978
541
1979
423
1980
347
1981
381
1982
464
1983
474
1984
566
1985
712
1986
770
1987
810
1988-89
963

PERFORMED IN TERMS OF THE 1975 AcT

°

,9 SOUTH, Dec. 13-17,1990.
LAw COMMSION, supra note

Operations to Remove Residues of Pregnancy
No figures available

29,979
33,194
35,759
32,839
29,596
32,500
36,062
35,882
35,038

144, at 4.97 n.72.

20 Id.at 4.87 n.64.
'

See T. Segal & D. Labe, Family Volence: W'fe Abuse, in PEOPLE AND VIOLENCE IN

SOUTH AFpCA25 I (13.Mckendrick &W. Hoffrinan eds., 199 1).
' Beanor Nash, Teenage Pregnancy- Need a ChildBeara Child?, 77S. AFR. MED.J.
147, 148 (1990).
20

Seegene/a

DEPr. OF NAT'L HEALTH & POPULATION DEV. ANN. REP.
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1989-90
1991
1992
1993

916
1,021
1,449
1,301 (until November)

173
38,020
33,305
205

It was believed that the real number of "operations for removal of
residues of pregnancy", which were resorted to in the main as an alternative
means to achieve an abortion, °6 was far higher than the official figure, partly
because many health-care workers ignore the laborious reporting mechanisms20 7
demanded by the Abortion and Sterilization Act.2' e Inany event, 90 percent of
operations for removal of residues of pregnancy were seen to be the result of
backstreet abortions.2' Figures suggest that 95,000 such operations were
performed between 1983 and 1985, with only 21 percent involving white
women and 60 percent involving black women. Again, the implication was that
many more black women than white women resort to the dangerous
alternatives of the backstreets. 1 June Cope notes:
South Africa's restrictive legislation creates an industry of
backstreet abortion. Gynecological wards are crowded with
its victims. Some of the women die; those who survive are
nursed backto health, to be exposed to the same risk on their
return home. Their vacated hospital beds are immediately
filled. Hospitals across the country, particularly in the urban
areas, suffer from an overload on their nursing and financial
services caused by this pressure on gynecological wards,
pressure which isa direct result of a law which denies a basic
medical care
human right: the right to early, safe and low-cost
21
for women faced with unwanted pregnancy. I
No figures are available for the removal of the residues of pregnancy for 1992 &
1993. Itis believed that these fgures were not released because they were too
inaccurate.
20

See Nash, supranote 203, at 148.

0 Letter from the South African Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists to its
members (June 199 1).
Act 2 of 1975.
SeeVan Oosten &Ferreira, supm note 13 1,at 419.
210 Id
211 CoPE, supmanote 6.3, at I.
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Serious complications resulting from backstreet abortions were
common.2 12 Abortion was the major reason for gynecological admission to
hospitals in South Aifrica? 3 and as many as 70 percent of maternal deaths in
hospitals in 1976 were the result of backstreet abortions. 214 Atotal of 2,881 out
of 6,274 admissions to Baragwanath hospital in 1978 were for complications
arising from abortions.21 s
The cost of bac&treet abortions for the women involved, as well as for
the health care system, was enormous. Kunst and Meiring document that the
2,881 women treated for post-abortion complications in 1978 at Baragwanath2 16
spent an average of 19 days in hospital. A total of 85 days between them was
spent in intensive care, costing them RI 50 per clay. 217 The cost involved in
caring forthe 1,085 patients who spent more than three days in the hospital was
R162, 750.218
In Pelonomi hospital in Bloernfontein, between 1980 and 1985, 12 out
of 81 maternal deaths were ascribed directly to abortion.2 19 At least 36 women
died because of abortion, according to a study of hospitals in South Africa from
1980-1982.22
At King Edward VIII hospital in Durban, 141 women were treated for
problems associated with backstreet abortions in 199 I, while 228 were treated
in 1989?2 Only 17 legal abortions were performed there in that year, while up
to four women a day were treated at Edendale hospital for problems arising from
backstreet abortion.m

See A. Richards, et al., The Inddence of Ma/or Abdominal Surgery after Septic
Abortn -An Indtcator of Compications Due to llegalAborfon, 68 S.AF MED.J. 799,
212

800(1985).
213
214
215
216

217
218

,e5C~
e id

1, 1976.
SeeJ. Mbere &A. Rubin, S.AM.J. OF HosP. MED. 193 (1979).
See Kunst & Meiring, supra note 141, at 265.
RAND DALY MAIL, Oct.

ee id.

See i.; see ao Marj Dyer, Abor'ons'Act -A Plea for a Commision of/nquiry, 15

SOCALWORK 185 (1979).

See B.F. Cooreman et al., Maternal Deaf at Peonomi Hospital, B/oem fontein
1980-85,76 S.AR MED.J. 24 (1989).
220 SeeE.G.M. Boes, MatemallMortalit ,inSouthemAfica 1980-82,71 S.AR MED.J.
219

158(1984).
22'

m

SeeDAiLYNEwS,Jan. 24, 1991.

SeeTHENATALWITNESSJune8, 1991.
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About 300 women a month were admitted to Baragwanath hospital for
abortion-related complications of which 60 percent were estimated to be the
result of backstreet attempts. m
While these figures were extremely disquieting in themselves, the real
statistics are unknown as there was very poor reporting of African deaths and,

indeed, injuries and illness, in South Africa. Itwas suggested that as much as 50
percent of all deaths were not registered. 4 Nevertheless, existing figures for
deaths due to backstreet abortion have been questioned. Some have callously
asked where all the dead bodies are of the women who died from backstreet
abortions.'m Reliable statistics for maternal mortality rates do not exist,2'
although it was thought that about7 three black women die daily in South Africa
because of backstreet abortions.2
The state argued consistently that the estimated number of backstreet
abortions was highly exaggerated. One view stated in Parliament in 1975 was:
If we are to take literally the views of a good cross-section of
members of this House, not only isthere a communist under
every bed in South Africa; there is in fact on top of every bed
a pregnant women waiting for an abortion. That is bad
enough, but then there isalso a cross-section in this House
who find a direct correlation between what is under the bed
and what is on top of it. Their confusion goes much further
than that because then they want to destroy what isunder the
bed and preserve what ison top ofthe bed.m
The Minister of Health, on receMnga delegation of women on May 15,
1986, stated that backstreet abortion was not a problem in South Africa. 9
When the 28,596 operations to remove the residues of pregnancy in 1984
increased to 32,500 the following year, he noted that only 18 of the women
See 1.Motsapi, Bara.AborfonShocker,SOWErAN, Nov. 25, 199 1.
M.Jacobs, Staffon Awnss ofChildren and Women in South Afica ChildHealth
SWtuw(United Nations Children's Rights Committee, 1992).
s SeeBertrand,supranote 104, at 16.
2
Seegena*L. RIsPEL&G. BEH-R HEALTH STATUS INDCATOFS: POLICYIMPUCATIONS
(1992).
SeeTHEARIus, May 15, 1992.
R.M. De Villiers, House of Assembly Hanard 12 Feb. 1975, Col. 616.
NEWSLETrER(Abortion Reform Action Group), Sept. 1986.
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involved showed signs of damage from foreign objects or injuries resulting from
interference, opining that even the 1,578 septic cases had been due to
endocrine imbalances.' 0 He also disputed the 2,881 cases of complications
from backstreet abortions treated at Baragwanath in 1978.2
Whatever the doubt concerning the incidence of backstreet abortion
and resultant maternal mortality rates, backstreet abortions clearly lead to
"permanent infertility and disability, drain on medical resources and expend of
public funds." 2
If one of the purposes of the Act was to limit the number of illegal
abortions, as was suggested," then the Act was been a dismal failure. The
sanctions set out for transgressing the law were of little effect in curbing
backstreet abortions. Identical penalties were set out for medically unqualified
people who perform abortions and for qualified medical practitioners who abort
withoutthe correct certification, or who issue a false certificate, or who operate
from an institution not authorized for that purpose.'
The relatively minor
penalty involved was fundamentally ineffective as a deterrent, considering the
monetary gains to be made in supplying abortions to a captive market.

/I. THE REAUTYOFWOMENs LIVES
The effect of the restrictive abortion legislation on the lives of women
was far-reaching and destructive. Both backstreet abortions and the continuation
of unwanted pregnancies in a context often devoid of prenatal care caused
irreparable harm to women's mental and physical health. Poor health and
unplanned children have a negative effect on women's employment prospects
and performance, undermining women's attempts at establishing economic
stability for existing family structures."3

0 See id.
23 Seeid.
23 See Kunst & Meiring, supra note 14 1, at 265.
2

See Armstrong, supra note 76, at 252.

Act 2 of 1975, § 10.
s See generaly Nicola Caine, Matemity Nght& ofBlack Worldng Mothers in South
Afican Law5 RESPONSA MERDwiNA 444 (1989); see also Barbara Klugman, Matemiy
ghty andBeneft andProtece Legisladonat Work, 9 S.Am LAB. BuLL. 25 (1983).
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Studies have shown that 49 percent of black women in Cape Town and
the Ciskei were pregnant by the age of 20"6 and 30 percent of all mothers in
Cape Town who carry their pregnancies to term are aged 19 or younger, with
five percent under the age of 16. 7 Further studies show that South African
teenage mothers are more likely than others to give birth prematurely and to
receive insufficient antenatal support. 8 Associated with this was the finding that
the younger the woman is when she has her first child, the fewer years of
schooling she has completed. Teenage mothers are, therefore, unable to obtain
employment and find themselves, "locked into unwanted motherhood, poverty,
and the lack of opportunity to achieve their full potential."2 9
A poor relationship between mother and baby has been associated with
premature childbearing, and it has been observed that children born to younger
mothers exhibit lower IQ levels than those born to older, more mature
mothers. According to Ncayiyana and Terhaar,24 ° children bom to younger
mothers are often abused, neglected and malnourished.
Also'of concern are illegitimacy rates that average 67 percent for black
mothers, 81.6 percent for colored mothers and 20 percent for white
mothers.2 4' In Cape Town, 68.2 percent of all African children born in
1988/1989 were born to single mothers 4 2
As far as the ability of women to claim maintenance was concerned,
research in Cape Town shows that over 85 percent of African fathers default on
their raintenance orders at some time.243 Burrman and Berger have shown that,
"awards are too low, the default rate extremely high, and unless a women
displays the utmost determination in instituting the case and subsequently

See Mary Roberts& M.R.ip, Black FertyPatternr- Cape Tow' and Cskei 66 S.

2

ASR. MED.J. 48 I, 482 (I 985).

7 SeeI.
De illIers, Ti

S

n

i die Paa-Hospita, 67 S.AFR. MED.

J.301 (1967).
z See Nash, supra note 203, at 148.
Jacobs, supra note 224, at 31.
240 See D.J. Ncayiyana &G. Terhaar, PregnantAdolescents in Rural Transkei, 75 S.AFR.
MED.J. 231, 232 (1989).
"' See De Villiers, supranote 237, at 301-2.
242 See Sandra Burman, Captarngon Afran Srengft: Women, Welfare and the Law,
in PUrTING WOMEN ON THEAGENDA, supranote 186, at 104.
243

See id
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pursuing arrears, she may well receive no maintenance."*2 This does not take
into account the many women who do not apply for such an order at all.24
The financial burden of raising a family isdisproportionately heavy for
poorwomen, in South Africa primarily black women. The relative position of
black women is one of severe oppression and poverty. Many of them are the
sole sources of income for their families. Pregnancy often results in a loss of
employment 47 especially in a climate of increasingly high unemployment. Even
ifa pregnant woman islucky enough to keep herjob or find a new one, day-care
for the new infant isa financial drain. Women's wages are substantially lower
than those of their male counterparts."' It istherefore extremely difficult for a
single mother to bring up a child. Child care is near impossible for those who
have migrated from the rural areas.
While those opposed to abortion often point to the alternatives
supposedly available to women who have an unplanned pregnancy, in reality
these "alternatives" expand or shrink in relation to race. Adoption and foster
care are often suggested as viable alternatives. For example, it was noted in
1975 duringthe abortion debate in Parliament that, 'we have satisfied ourselves
that the unwanted child does have a place in our community and that he is
accepted as such by implication. I shall tell hon. members why. We have
orphanages and other institutions which adopt such children. They are not
rejected but given the best."249
But was this true, when there were homes in South Africa for only
2,000 black children in need of care?" 0 This is in contrast to the 10,000 places
2
available for white children, a much smaller section of the population. 51

'" S.Burman &S.Berger, When FarniSupport FaiL.: The Problems ofMantenance
Pament;in ApartheidSouthAfrica (Part I), 4 S.AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 194(1988); seealso
S. Burman & S. Berger, When Fami , Support Fals: The Problems of Maintenance
Paymentsin ApartheidSouthAfca 2art2),4 S.AF:RJ. HUM.RTS. 334 (1988).
"s See Burman, supra note 186, at 104.

See National Counal of Negro Women Amics Bnef, WOmANs RIGHTs LAW
REPORTER297, 303 (1989).
2'6

247 See COCK ErAL., supra note 178, at 45-48.
248 SeeBurman, supranote 186, at 104.
'9
's

251

HJ. Coetzee, House of Assembly Hansard 12 Feb. 1975, Col. 613.
D JLYNEws, Sept. 18,1991.
See id
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VIII. LEGAL DEMELOPmENTSAROUNDABORTION FROM 1975 TO 1994
Inspite of many calls overthe years for a review of the legislation,2 2 the
apartheid government was consistent in its attitude that itwould not investigate
the views and attitudes ofthe general public and that no amendments would be
enacted to change the basic tenet ofthe law.
In 1981 Minister of Health LAPA Munnik said, "[wje do not intend to
liberalize abortion inthis country as long as we are in power. " 3 Even the draft
bill (198 I) that permitted an abortion in cases where there had been a failed
sterilization was withdrawn' after objections from the churches 5s
The appointment of an inquiry into the working of the Act was
requested repeatedly but unsuccessfully both inand outside of Parliament The
Minister of Health, who chaired the earlier commission in 1974, stated in 1983,
and repeated subsequently, that such acommission would serve no purpose, as
the Act was working well. He noted that the SA Society of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists was satisfied with the Act at the time it was passed. But, infact, of
the obstetricians and gynecologists surveyed by Dommisse in 1980,6 82
percent favored changes to the Act while 32 percent favored abortion on
request These figures were replicated in asecond survey in 1990: 85 percent
of obstetricians and gynecologists believed that the Act ought to be changed and
40 percent supported abortion on request. 7
In 1990, the Department of Health asked for submissions with regard
to the feelings of the public about the Abortion and Sterilization Act. The
invitation for submissions was never advertised but on March 20, 1990, the
department issued a press release inviting members of the public to send in
comments and motivations. This request for submissions was particularly strange
*as the Minister, Rina Venter, had stated repeatedlythatthere was no intention
to change the Act. However, the Minister justified the invitation of comments on
the basis that this was "an attempt to test the broader opinion of the
community.'
See HELEN SuzmAN, INNo UNCERTAIN TERMs 260-61 (1993).
z NEWSLErrER(Abortion Reform Action Group), May21, 1982.
SeeVan Oosten &Ferreira, supranote 13 1,at 421.
21s NEWSLETTER, supra note 253
z' See George Dommisse, The South Afican Gynaecologists'Attitude to the Present
Aborton Law, 57 S.AFR. MED.J. 1044 (1980).
' See George Dommisse, Current Atttudes ofMembers ofSASOG to the Present
Lawon Aborion, 74 S.AFR. MED.J. 702,702-703 (1990).
252
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Accordingto the Minister, there were a total of 48,486 responses to the
invitation.5 8 In a political culture where the state took little notice of the views
of the community, 48,000 submissions was all but unimaginable." 9 The
Minister's response to this observation was to note that, in fact, there had been
only 2,187 responses, consisting of 1,876 letters and memoranda and 31 I
petitions. She said thatthe figure of 48,846 had been arrived at by counting each
name appearing on the lists attached to the petitions. 260
The Minister claimed further that less than one percent of the
submissions had been in favor of change to the law,"6 thereby implying that
fewer than 500 people were against the provisions of the Act. But groups
known to have made submissions and who supported changes to the Act had
memberships far greaterthan 500. The South African Society of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists had 350 members, Arag had 400, the Civ Rights League had
400, which was over 1,000 already. Beyond these bodies, other groups and
individuals made submissions supporting amendment of the law.
But no changes were made to the Act, despite many criticisms and the
justification for this by the Minister was, "pointed out that well-motivated
submissions which can improve the present Act, without changing its basic
principles, will be considered. A very good response from people from all walks
of life and population groups was received. Itwas clear that no submission made
any contribution to improve the Act"' 2
But one has to doubt that not one of the nearly 50,000 people who
made "submissions" made any suggestion that was worth implementing. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the following comment appeared in a women's
magazine, "Nobody ever got anything by being polite in South African politics.
We need a female equivalent of MK (the armed wing of the African National
Congress) before Rina Venter alters legislation. " '
The only case dealing directly with the Act and its implementation since
the Collop case, was the 1993 case of G v. Supetintendent Groote Schuur
Hosplia, andofter?5 Inthis case, the applicant attempted to interdict her 14year-old daughter from having an abortion after having been raped. The main
2-8

THEARGus, May30, 1991.

See author's comnents i Pippa Green, Aborton, CosMopoUrAN, Jan. 1991,at 80.
See id
2'' THE STAR, May 30, 199 1.
' Letter from Mnister RinaVenter to Pippa Green, Cosmopolitan (on file with author).
20 C. Scott, CosmopouTAN, Aug. 1993, at 16, 17.
26 1993 (2) SA 255 (C).
259
26

1998

SOUTH AFRICA'S ABORTION LAWS

181

questions for the court were whether the provisions of the Act had been met
and whether consent for the abortion had been properly obtained in terms of
the Child Care Act, which provided for alternatives where the guardian of the
child would not, or could not, consent 2 The financial involvement in the case
of Pro-Life, an organization concerned with the protection of the fetus, marked
the beginningofatrend which is likelyto continue as the abortion issue isfought
within the constitutional arena.' 6
G v. Superintendent Groote SchuurHospital, and others specifically
involved the interpretation of two Acts of Parliament: the Abortion and
Sterilization Act and the Child Care Act. Because parliamentary supremacy still
existed, all the court was able to do was to determine whether the procedures
called for by the Acts had been followed.
Some of the points raised by counsel for the applicant in the case and
discounted by the court were the following
1)thattheActapplies to a woman and not a female under the
age of 18;
2) that the certificates issued by the doctors were invalid
because of discrepancies;
3)thatthe magistrate's certificate was invalid as the magistrate
had issued it without having all the information about the case
before him;
4)thatnovalid consentforthe abortion had been obtained as
the provisions of the Child Care Act had not been complied
with.
The court disagreed with the objections raised by the plaintiff and permitted the
abortion, findingthat the provisions of the Abortion and Sterilization Act and the
Child Care Act had been complied with.

Se
&eGvSuperintendent, Groote Schuur Hospital, and others, 1993 (2) SA255 (C)

(Seligson, AJ).
26
See id.at 258J.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Abortion regulation in Apartheid South Africa was underpinned by
racism and patriarchy which were the major reasons for the enactment of the
1975 abortion law. While the role of religion has been important, it should not
be overstated in the light of the fact that the law did not give legal status to the
fetus. The law only permitted certain rights to accrue to the fetus and then only
if it was subsequently bor alive. The fetus did not have legal personality until
birth. This will be a crucial factor when the issue of whether a fetus isa person
or not comes before the Constitutional Court.
The motivation for enactment of the 1975 South African abortion law
was not protection of the fetus or assistance to women but rather the interests
of the male medico-legal fraternity. White male doctors, white male lawyers,
white male judges, white male members of the clergy and white male politicians
have ensured thatwhite male interests took precedence over those of women,
forwhom the abortion issue had much more relevance. White men controlled
the process of adopting a new law and white men determined the content of the
law. Their attitudes towards women were dismissive and sexist in the extreme.
The 1975 law was not, in the main, intended to impact on the black
population. The attitudes of this major segment of the population and, indeed,
the attitudes ofwomen, were ignored. Where alternative attitudes were known,
they were dismissed. This disregard of the views of the wider public's continued
right into the 1990s.
Throughout the operation of the 1975 Abortion and Sterilization Act,
public opinion was either ignored or inaccurately reported by the state. At the
same time, little was done to assess the damage caused by the Act, which forced
women to resort to the backstreets, to the detriment of their health and lives.
The procedures required before an abortion could lawfully be performed were
exceptionally stringent. The complexity of these procedures, coupled with the
lack of privacy they impose and a concomitant disregard of a woman's need for
secrecy, confidentiality and immediacy, perpetuates a continued dependency on
backstreet abortion.
The statistics testif to the ineffectiveness of the Act, revealing that
between 100,000 and 500,000 South Arican women underwent illegal
abortions annually. The statistics also reflect the near impossibility of obtaining
a legal abortion, both in terms of the grounds on which an abortion can legally
be obtained and the extremely arduous procedures that had to be followed.
Another aspect of these figures is what they show about the demographic
distribution ofthose having abortions; the women who sought illegal abortions
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in South Africa were mostly very young, poor, black women while the majority
of women who obtained legal abortions were white women from more
privileged socio-economic backgrounds.
The interim South African Constitution, concluded in 1993 and which
entered into force on April 27, 1994, did not deal with questions such as
abortion, because of disagreement between the negotiators of that Constitution.
However, with such a legacy it is not surprising that the 1996 South African
Constitution, while not expressly providing for the right to an abortion on
request, provides a regulatory framework which will most likely be interpreted
to include a woman's rightto choose a safe, early abortion. One clause that will
impact on abortion isthe equality clause 7 which prevents discrimination on the
grounds of pregnancy. The clause recognizes that although men and women
have different biological roles in relation to reproduction, women are often
disadvantaged by the social consequences of pregnancy and child-bearing.
The most relevant clause to abortion is Section 12(2), which deals with
freedom and security of the person, which provides that
Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity
which includes the right;
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction;
(b) to security in and control over their body; and
(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments
without their informed consent.-'m
This provision is contained in the Constitution, as it was argued, that if an
abortion section was contained in the constitution then, other then changes on
the margins, the issue would largely be decided once and for all. 6'

7 Act2 of 1975, §9.
See general Jeremy Sarkin, Aborton and the Court; in TowARDS A FINAL
CONSTI UTION:A GENDER PEFSPECrIVE (S. Uebenberg ed., 1995).

1' See Jeremy Sarkin, Mhy There Should Be An Abortion Cause in the Final
Constuon,4 S.AFRJ. HUm. RTS. 582 (1995).
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The enactment of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy At 2 70 in
1996 was a breakthrough for gender equality and signaled the recognition of a
woman's right to make decisions about reproduction and to control her own

body.

270 Act 92 of 1996.

